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| [[File:Topic Cover - 4.2 Finding Patterns in Random Noise.png|thumb]]
| | {{Cover|4.2 Finding Patterns in Random Noise}} |
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| Humans are so good at identifying patterns that we often see them even when it is really noise in masquerade. When we think we have seen a pattern, how do we quantify the level of confidence correctly? We describe common pitfalls that lead to an overconfidence in an apparent pattern, some that even prey on the inattentive scientist! | | Humans are so good at identifying patterns that we often see them even when it is really noise in masquerade. When we think we have seen a pattern, how do we quantify the level of confidence correctly? We describe common pitfalls that lead to an overconfidence in an apparent pattern, some that even prey on the inattentive scientist! |
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| # Recognize and explain the flaw in scenarios in which scientists and other people mistake noise for signal. | | # Recognize and explain the flaw in scenarios in which scientists and other people mistake noise for signal. |
| # Resist the opposing temptations of both the Gambler's Fallacy (the expectation that a run of similar events will soon break and quickly balance out, because of the assumption that small samples resemble large samples) and the Hot-hand Fallacy (the expectation that a run will continue, because runs suggest non-randomness). | | # Resist the opposing temptations of both the Gambler's Fallacy (the expectation that a run of similar events will soon break and quickly balance out, because of the assumption that small samples resemble large samples) and the Hot-hand Fallacy (the expectation that a run will continue, because runs suggest non-randomness). |
| | # '''(Data Science)''' Describe the difference between the effect size (strength of pattern) and credence level (probability that the pattern is real), and identify the role each plays in decision making. |
| {{BoxCaution|People underestimate the frequency of apparent patterns produced by randomness, leading to over-perception of spurious signal much more frequently than people account for. Events that are just coincidental are much more likely than most people expect.}} | | {{BoxCaution|People underestimate the frequency of apparent patterns produced by randomness, leading to over-perception of spurious signal much more frequently than people account for. Events that are just coincidental are much more likely than most people expect.}} |
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| * Running a test or similar tests too many times, reporting only statistically significant results. | | * Running a test or similar tests too many times, reporting only statistically significant results. |
| * The effect also occurs in everyday life, e.g. when one looks at a whole lot of phenomena and only takes note of the most surprising-looking patterns, not properly taking into account the larger number of unsurprising patterns/lack of pattern.}} | | * The effect also occurs in everyday life, e.g. when one looks at a whole lot of phenomena and only takes note of the most surprising-looking patterns, not properly taking into account the larger number of unsurprising patterns/lack of pattern.}} |
| {{Definition|''<math>p</math>-hacking''|A subset of the Look Elsewhere Effect that occurs when people conduct multiple statistical tests and only report those with <math>p</math>-values over .05 (the traditional threshold for publication and statistical significance, which indicates a tolerance of 5% false positives).}} | | {{Definition|''<math>p</math>-hacking''|A subset of the Look Elsewhere Effect that occurs when people conduct multiple statistical tests and only report those with <math>p</math>-values under .05 (the traditional threshold for publication and statistical significance, which indicates a tolerance of 5% false positives).}} |
| {{BoxCaution|A <math>p</math>-value cutoff of .05 thus indicates that, on average, 1 in 20 results will be false positives. So one should expect, on average, one false positive for every 20 independent analyses of pure noise. <math>p</math>-hacking is statistically problematic but more often a result of misunderstanding than deliberate fraudulence.}} | | {{BoxCaution|A <math>p</math>-value cutoff of .05 thus indicates that, on average, 1 in 20 results will be false positives. So one should expect, on average, one false positive for every 20 independent analyses of pure noise. <math>p</math>-hacking is statistically problematic but more often a result of misunderstanding than deliberate fraudulence.}} |
| {{BoxTip|title=Common Techniques for <math>p</math>-hacking| | | {{BoxTip|title=Common Techniques for <math>p</math>-hacking| |